Impact of the Expansion of Private Brands on Korean Retail and Manufacturing by LEE, JINKOOK
KDI Journal of Economic Policy 2018, 40(2):1–21 
http://dx.doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2018.40.2.1 
1 
Impact of the Expansion of Private Brands 
on Korean Retail and Manufacturing† 
By JINKOOK LEE* 
The private brands (PB) of corporate retailers are booming in Korea. 
This paper examines the effect of the rise of PB on Korean retail and 
manufacturing. By utilizing both store-level data and firm-level data, I 
find that the expansion of PB elevates the profits of corporate retailers 
but does not significantly affect, and in some cases even reduces, those 
of subcontracting manufacturers. This occurs not only because sales 
of national brands (NB) decline due to the launch of similar PBs but 
also because the imbalance in the bargaining positions of the two 
parties has caused retail margins to be set high while manufacturers’ 
operating profits are set low. The paper provides policy recommendations 
for fair contracts and cooperative development between retail and 
manufacturing companies. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
eginning with food and daily necessities and now spanning across all 
consumer goods, private brands (PB) of corporate retailers are booming in 
Korea. An increasing number of PBs are rising as top sellers, and product quality 
now rivals that of national brands (NB).1 The overall market size of PBs accounts 
for one fourth of all sales in the corporate retail industry. Indeed, we have entered 
the golden age of PBs, with large discount stores, super supermarkets (SSM) and 
convenience stores at the helm. 
This impressive growth of the market necessitates a concrete understanding of 
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1A private brand (PB) product is a type of good produced by one company (manufacturer) for exclusive sale 
under another company's (retailer) brand and available only at its stores. A national brand (NB) product refers to 
manufactured goods for sale under the manufacturer's brand and available at any store around the country. 
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and objective views on the PB business in Korea. However, official statistics are 
very insufficient, and thus data from several sources and numerous calculations are 
required even to begin to understand the size of the PB market. 
Moreover, key issues that are critical when attempting to understand the PB 
business―the industrial background of market growth, its impact on the growth of 
retail and manufacturing industries, PB development methods, and types of unfair 
trade practices―have yet to be analyzed.2 
Focusing on these issues, the study empirically examines the domestic PB 
industry. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper which utilizes micro-
level data to analyze the effects of PB expansion on both Korean retail and 
manufacturing sectors. Thereupon, suggestions will be presented with regard to 
policy directions for sustainable growth and a fair market order. 
 
II. Related Literature 
 
Previous studies of PB have mainly dealt with the issues of price and quality 
levels, rivalry between PBs and NBs, and the influence on related firms and 
sectors. These studies mostly focused on the European and U.S. markets, where 
PBs have been actively launched and thus have a strong market presence.  
With reference to the price level, Griffith et al. (2009) analyzed the UK food 
market. Using household scanner data in 2006, they found that economy store 
brands are 39% less expensive than NBs and that standard store brands are 25% 
less expensive than NBs.3  
Bontemps et al. (2008) showed that there existed a positive correlation between 
PB entry and NB prices and that this relationship was particularly evident in NBs 
with high market shares. Olbrich and Grewe (2009) also found that consumer 
prices rose after the launch of a PB, whereas the overall product diversity 
decreased. Considering that PBs are usually less expensive than NBs of similar 
quality levels, one may think that the introduction of PBs contributes to lowering 
the overall price level. However, as both of the aforementioned studies show, 
retailers who set final consumer prices are tempted to raise NB prices to increase 
the market share of their PBs, making the overall price level increase or decrease 
depending on their market shares.  
Another group of studies discusses the effect of PB expansion on retailer 
earnings. Ailawadi and Harlam (2004) found that PBs had higher percentage 
margins than NBs and that retailers with higher PB shares tended to have higher 
percentage margins on NBs as well.4 With a more microscopic approach, Richards 
et al. (2010) investigated the US California ice cream market. By estimating a 
structural model, he found that retailers' percentage margins tended to be higher, 
especially in cases when PBs imitated NBs.  
 
2Although some of these issues have been addressed in the European and US markets, there has been scant 
analysis of the Korean PB market. 
3In the United Kingdom and Europe, the term „store brand‟ is commonly used to refer to PBs. Griffith et al. 
(2009) divided PBs into standard own brands (cheaper than NBs), economy own brands (cheaper than NBs but 
with poor packaging) and premium own brands (comparable to NBs). 
4„Percentage margin‟ in these studies refers to the retail margin relative to the final consumer price. 
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Further, Raju et al. (1995) shows that retailers‟ profits from PB launches  
increase when price competition between NB goods is low and price competition 
between PBs and NBs is severe. This implies that certain conditions need to be met 
in order for higher PB sales to lead to higher profitability of retailers.  
With regard to the effect on the manufacturer, Cho et al. (2012) analyzed the 
effects of PB delivery on the performance of Korean manufacturers. They 
conducted surveys of 55 manufacturers and reported that 51% of manufacturers 
were worried about decreased operating profits due to the low delivery price of 
PBs. The paper also showed that manufacturers with sales exceeding 10 billion 
won experienced more of a decline in their operating profits than those with lower 
sales volumes. 
Other papers studied the factors influencing PB market development. For 
example, Dhar and Hoch (1997) analyzed the food sales data of 50 U.S. retailers 
and found that the variety of PB items, the availability of premium PBs, the 
number of PB stores, and consumers‟ incomes and ages in a region to be the main 
causes of differential PB outcomes. On the development gap of PB markets across 
countries, Cuneo et al. (2015) discussed the distribution structure, logistics 
structure, and retailer typology as the main contributing factors. 
As Korea's PB market has grown, public surveys have been steadily continuing. 
The Korea Consumer Agency (2008; 2011; 2014) investigated differences in 
prices, quality levels, and raw materials between PBs and NBs. It also surveyed PB 
sales trends, consumers' purchase behaviors and satisfaction levels, and so on. 
While the survey has only focused on large discount stores thus far, it is becoming 
more necessary to broaden the scope of the investigation so as to include SSMs and 
convenience stores, which are leading the growth in the Korean PB market at 
present. 
 
III. Current Status of the Korean PB Market 
 
In PB sales took off in earnest starting in the late 2000s. The market grew 2.5 
fold in five years, from 3.6 trillion won in 2008 to 9.3 trillion won in 2013 (left 
panel of Figure 1). 5  Although the economic slowdown weakened consumer 
sentiment overall during this period, the PB market maintained its upward 
momentum owing to the increasing demand for economical products and the 
supply at all types of retail channels. 
Large discount stores, the originators of the PB market, remain the largest sellers 
of PBs. However, heated competition and market restrictions have dampened their 
sales growth since 2011. 
Rather, convenience stores are now spurring new growth. The three largest 
chains (GS25, 7-Eleven and CU) increased their PB sales by a staggering 16 fold 
such that the share of PB sales rose to 28.8% in 2013 (right panel of Figure 1). This  
 
5The market size of PBs refers to the sum of PB sales at all samples (=3 major large discount store chains + 3 
major SSM chains + 3 convenience store chains). PB sales at other retailers in addition to these are reported, 
though irregularly, in the Korea Chain Store Association‟s Yearbook of Retailers, but their share is less than 1% of 
the total PB sales for each business type. 
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FIGURE 1. PB SALES (LEFT) AND SHARE OF PB TO TOTAL SALES (RIGHT): 
COMPARISON BETWEEN LARGE DISCOUNT STORES, SSMS AND CONVENIENCE STORES. 
Note: Each category represents the top three chains with the highest sales volumes. 
Source: Calculated using the Yearbook of Retailers (2009~2015) and companies‟ annual reports (same period). 
 
was possible because, unlike large discount stores and SSMs, convenience stores 
are not bound by restrictions in terms of opening new stores. Moreover, 24-hour 
operations and PBs based on convenience foods met the needs of both the local 
community and single-person households. 
Indeed, the axis of the PB market is shifting towards convenience stores at an 
accelerated pace. Accordingly, large discount stores such as Emart and HomePlus 
are now entering the convenience store business.6 
When compared to foreign retailers (left panel in Figure 2), Korean retail chains‟ 
overall share of PB sales is not much lower than that of other global retail chains; it 
is below those of Aldi & Lidl, Sainsbury and Tesco but similar to those of Kroger, 
Costco and Walmart. 
On the other hand, PB sales when compared to all retail trade in Korea (general 
retail + specialized retail) account for a mere 3.1% of total sales (right panel in 
Figure 2).7 This is slightly higher than the average for Asia but far below that of 
Europe, Oceania and America, where retail industries are more advanced. 
Nonetheless, considering that Korea‟s PB market is in its infancy, there is potential 
for further growth. This may be true particularly as Korea‟s PB market is 
exhibiting a development pattern similar to those of its counterparts in 
Europe―wherein an oligopoly of a few companies has stimulated the PB business.  
 
6Since starting their respective convenience store businesses, Emart and HomePlus have actively expanded 
their numbers of stores (With Me and 365PLUS, respectively). As of July of 2016, there were 1,422 With Me 
stores and 402 365PLUS stores nationwide (The Korea Economic Daily, Aug. 22 2016). Recently, With Me was 
rebranded to Emart 24. 
7Nielsen (2014) determined a country's PB sales share by calculating the share of PB sales in total sales in the 
retail business. This study applies the same calculation to gauge Korea's PB sales to make international 
comparisons easier.  
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FIGURE 2. SHARE OF PB SALES BY RETAIL CHAIN (LEFT) AND CONTINENT (RIGHT): 
Note: 1) Share of PB sales by company (%, as of 2014) = PB sales / Company sales. 2) Share of PB sales by 
country (%, as of 2013) = Total PB sales / Total retailer sales. 3) Share of PB sales by continent is the mean of the 
share of PB sales by country within the continent. 
Source: Calculated using PLMA (2014); Nielsen (2014); Korea Chain Store Association (2014); Statistics Korea, 
“Wholesale and Retail Trade Survey Microdata,” 2013. 
 
IV. Structural Changes Underlying the PB Expansion 
in the Korean Retail Industry 
 
A. Market Concentration in General Retail 
 
The following section examines the structural changes within the retail sector 
that spurred on and nurtured the PB industry. Above all, it is important to note that 
the recent growth of the general retail business was heavily dependent on the 
growth of corporate retailers. Figure 3 shows that the market for general retail 
expanded by 53.7 trillion won in the period of 2003~2014, of which 78% (41.9 
trillion won) stemmed from increased sales by corporate retailers.  
Accordingly, the share held by corporate retailers in general retail advanced 
from 67.8% to 73.1% over the same period. This implies that corporate retail 
businesses have taken a larger stake in the distribution of manufactured goods, thus 
strengthening the influence of this sector over consumers.  
However, these changes may aggravate the imbalance in the bargaining position 
between corporate retailers and manufacturers. As sellers, manufacturers have a 
greater economic incentive to supply their products to large retailers who dominate 
the retail market. Conversely, this means that the business loss to the 
manufacturing company can be significant when the transaction is halted for any 
reason. 
On the other hand, as buyers, retailers have little difficulty in finding alternative 
suppliers who can offer similar or more favorable contract terms. Additionally, 
even when a contract is terminated, there is little impact on the total sales of corporate  
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FIGURE 3. CHANGES IN SALES BY RETAIL BUSINESS TYPE 
Note: Corporate retail encompasses department stores, large discount stores, SSMs within supermarkets, and 
convenience stores. 
Source: Based on Statistics Korea, “Wholesale and Retail Trade Survey Microdata,” 2003~2014. 
 
retailers, as they have tens of thousands of products on their shelves. 
PBs are created when corporate retailers participate in the planning, production, 
and labeling of products, all of which were traditionally conducted by 
manufacturing companies. This intervention is only possible when such retailers 
possess strong buyers‟ power. In other words, market concentration in general 
retail is a prerequisite to the creation of PBs; accordingly, small independent stores 
do not have PBs. 
 
B. Intensifying Competition between Large Retailers 
 
As much as the level of buyers‟ power determines the creation of PBs, the 
competition between corporate retailers affects the economic incentive to release 
them. In fact, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of corporate retailers 
(diamond line in Figure 4)8 has been in decline since 2006, pointing to more 
heated competition between rivals. 
In the midst of the intensifying competition, if shelves were stocked with NB 
products, corporate retailers would have no other choice but to engage in a discount 
war as a means to gain a competitive edge. This strategy, however, cannot serve as 
a long-term solution, as the ensuing price competition would eventually diminish 
the delivery price and retail margin. 
In contrast, PBs offer product differentiation because corporate retailers are able 
to decide on the product features and sell the products exclusively at their stores. 
Thus, retailers are free from consumers‟ direct comparisons of price and quality 
and can set a stable retail margin. Additionally, differentiated products contribute to  
 
8This study calculates HHI using the market share of each retail store, taking into account the level of 
observation in the Wholesale and Retail Trade Survey MDIS: 
2
H H I 1 0 , 0 0 0 Si
i
  . 
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FIGURE 4. HHI, SALES AND PB SALES SHARE IN CORPORATE RETAIL BUSINIESS 
Note: Corporate retailers include large discount stores, SSMs within supermarkets, and convenience stores. The 
share of PB sales is the share of the three largest chains of large discount stores and SSMs.9 
Source: Based on the Korea Chain Store Association, Yearbook of Retailers (2009~2015) and companies‟ annual 
reports (2009~2015). 
 
differentiation among stores, which, in turn, strengthens customer loyalty.  
In all, it is evident that PBs are a profit-maximizing solution created by retailers 
in response to such structural changes as greater market concentration levels and 
intensifying competition within the market. 
 
V. Impact of Increased PB Sales on the Growth of Corporate Retailers 
 
A. Data and Empirical Specifications 
 
While retailers have been thrilled with the launch of PBs, there is very little 
evidence pertaining to whether the strategy has actually helped their growth. To 
identify this, this paper secured two groups of data. The first group refers to the 
Wholesale and Retail Trade Survey MDIS (2006~2014, Statistics Korea), 
including information on sales, expenses, and profits for individual stores.10 
The second dataset should be PB sales information. Because the observations in 
MDIS are at the store level, obtaining PB sales information at the store level would 
be ideal for merging data and identifying this effect. However, in that such data do 
not exist at present, I construct an average PB sales ratio by distribution type and 
year, where the distribution type includes large discount stores, SSMs, convenience 
 
9Three major convenience store chains are excluded from the calculation of the PB sales share due to limited 
data. If sufficient annual data could be applied, it is expected that the share of PB sales (square line in Figure 4) 
would rise steeply to the right.  
10This data also include business information such as the store location, number of employees, number of 
annual business months, average daily business hours, store floor area and other information, making it easy to 
create various control variables. 
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stores, and small independent stores.11  
Finally, I merge the PB sales ratio with the MDIS data based on the 
subcategories (at the five-digit level) in the standard industry classification code. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the retail data. 
 
TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS OF RETAIL DATA 
Variables No. of Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Sales (100 million won) 39,391 90.09 272.28 0.01 4,898.51 
PB Sales Ratio (0~1) 38,296 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.33 
Large Discount Store (0/1) 39,391 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Supermarket (0/1) 39,391 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Convenience Store (0/1) 39,391 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Headquarters (0/1) 39,391 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Branch (0/1) 39,391 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Independent Store (0/1) 39,391 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Shop Area (m2) 39,391 1,358.02 4,125.40 10.00 98,461 
Business Period (months) 37,604 106.29 77.79 1.00 706.00 
Business Months per Year 39,391 11.01 2.57 1.00 12.00 
Average Business Hours per Day 39,391 4.67 0.76 1.00 5.00 
Days Closed per Month 39,391 4.35 2.21 1.00 6.00 
Sales 
Composition 
Ratio 
Between 
Headquarters and 
Branch 
39,388 0.08 1.75 0.00 100.00 
Wholesaler 39,389 0.05 1.23 0.00 98.00 
Retailer 39,384 0.69 6.61 0.00 100.00 
Industrial Activity 39,389 0.56 6.15 0.00 100.00 
Consumer 39,390 98.56 9.48 0.00 100.00 
Overseas Exports 39,388 0.01 0.69 0.00 100.00 
Etc. 39,386 0.06 1.21 0.00 100.00 
Purchase 
Composition 
Ratio 
Between 
Headquarters and 
Branch 
39,379 19.27 38.13 0.00 100.00 
Producer 39,386 13.92 31.35 0.00 100.00 
Wholesaler 39,391 65.28 45.19 0.00 100.00 
Overseas Exports 39,386 0.27 4.12 0.00 100.00 
Etc. 39,388 1.26 9.90 0.00 100.00 
Source: Statistics Korea, “Wholesale and Retail Trade Survey MDIS,” 2006~2014; Statistics Korea, “Economic 
Census MDIS,” 2010; Korea Chain Store Association, the Yearbook of Retailers (2009~2015); Companies‟ Annual 
Reports (2006~2015).  
 
11Specifically, because PB sales data could not be established at the store level, I constructed it at the 
enterprise level instead using the Yearbook of Retailers and a range of other sources. However, the enterprise level 
of PB sales data could not be merged and utilized due to missing business registration numbers and corporation 
registration numbers in MDIS. Finally, I derive the average PB sales ratio by year and distribution type (five-digit 
code in KSIC). 
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The estimation model has the following form: 
 
(1)  
i js t j t i js t s s t t i js t
s t
y P B X D T u          
The dependent variable 
i js t
y  denotes the sales (or profits) of store i  of 
distribution type j  located in region s  in year t . For example, 
i js t
y  can 
represent the sales of a certain large discount store located in Seoul in 2013. 
j t
P B  is the PB sales ratio, which is the proportion of PB sales to total sales by 
distribution type and year. When constructing the PB sales ratio at the distribution 
type level, we need a relatively strong assumption that stores in the same category 
have the same PB sales ratio. This assumption is generally realistic in that stores 
operated by a corporate retailer are standardized in terms of their supply 
characteristics, product composition, sales method, and shopping environment.12,13 
i js t
X  is a vector of various store characteristics, including the distribution type, 
annual business months, average daily business hours, number of holidays, and 
store floor area. 
s
D  is a vector of region dummies at the metropolitan city level. 
t
T  is a vector of year dummies controlling for the effects of the overall economic 
downturn on domestic demand since the mid-2000s. 
i j s t
u  is an i.i.d. error term.
14
 
 
B. Estimation Results 
 
Model (1) in Table 2 reports OLS estimates, which show that a 1%p rise in the 
PB sales ratio tends to increase a store‟s sales by 165 million won. This estimate is 
statistically significant, but its magnitude appears to be relatively large, as 165 
million won is equivalent to around 2% of sales.15 
Meanwhile, the error terms may not satisfy the IID condition. Because stores in 
the same category (i.e., discount store, SSM, or convenience store) can be 
influenced by common factors, the distribution of the error terms can vary with the 
category. Considering this heteroscedasticity, model 2 estimates the equation with 
iterative reweighted least square (IRLS) method, a robust type of regression. According 
 
12Nevertheless, given that the demand characteristics of each store may differ, it is necessary to utilize PB 
sales shares by each store or company. In the future, more abundant PB sales information must be generated and 
constructed in order to promote further studies. 
13If the PB sales ratio can be merged at more micro-levels (enterprise or store level), there is an advantage in 
that the potential endogeneity problem can be mitigated in a regression analysis. Because PBs tend to be released 
in profitable categories, adverse causality may exist. To address this, Ailawadi and Harlam (2004) estimated a 
simultaneous equation system, using one equation with the distribution profit as a dependent variable and the other 
equation with PB sales as the dependent variable. 
14As the PB ratio is generated at the aggregated level according to the distribution type and year, it is likely 
that the correlation between the PB ratio and various fixed effects will increase. Accordingly, various fixed effects 
(time, location, distribution type) were controlled. Therefore, „α‟ measures how much sales increase when the PB 
ratio of the average or representative store rises. Because the coefficient measures the average effect, a large 
discount store will have a greater impact and convenience stores will have relatively smaller impacts compared to 
the average effect.  
15The average sales amount for retail stores in the sample is 9 billion won. 
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TABLE 2—EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN THE PB SALES RATIO ON THE SALES OF RETAIL STORES 
Dep. Var.: Sales  
(100 million won) 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
IRLS 
(3) 
WLS_Firm 
(4) 
WLS_Emp 
PB Sales Ratio (0~1) 
164.71*** 
(28.18) 
22.33*** 
(0.69) 
25.18*** 
(3.81) 
28.52*** 
(3.92) 
Large Discount Store (0/1) 
482.42*** 
(5.25) 
382.04*** 
(0.13) 
513.18*** 
(2.07) 
512.90*** 
(2.09) 
Supermarket (0/1) 
25.65*** 
(2.63) 
0.55*** 
(0.06) 
10.63*** 
(0.44) 
10.77*** 
(0.45) 
Headquarters (0/1) 
30.18*** 
(2.56) 
3.88*** 
(0.06) 
21.14*** 
(0.53) 
21.33*** 
(0.55) 
Branch (0/1) 
56.63*** 
(4.61) 
6.91*** 
(0.11) 
34.49*** 
(1.10) 
34.88*** 
(1.12) 
Shop Area (m2) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Business Period (months) 
0.16*** 
(0.01) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.03*** 
(0.00) 
0.03*** 
(0.00) 
Number of Stores in Region 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Business Months per Year 
1.48*** 
(0.33) 
0.31*** 
(0.01) 
0.86*** 
(0.07) 
0.88*** 
(0.07) 
Average Business Hours per Day 
13.43*** 
(1.40) 
-0.37*** 
(0.03) 
3.38*** 
(0.30) 
3.44*** 
(0.31) 
Closed Days per Month 
7.41*** 
(0.96) 
0.29*** 
(0.02) 
1.20*** 
(0.21) 
1.17*** 
(0.21) 
Number of Households 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Sales Composition Ratio 
(between Headquarters and Branch) 
2.75*** 
(0.84) 
1.38*** 
(0.02) 
-0.33 
(0.28) 
-0.32 
(0.28) 
Sales Composition Ratio 
(Wholesaler) 
6.13*** 
(0.97) 
7.01*** 
(0.02) 
3.49*** 
(0.36) 
3.50*** 
(0.36) 
Sales Composition Ratio 
(Retailer) 
0.04 
(0.68) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.99*** 
(0.26) 
-0.99*** 
(0.26) 
Sales Composition Ratio 
(Industrial Activity) 
-0.87 
(0.68) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-1.03*** 
(0.26) 
-1.03*** 
(0.27) 
Sales Composition Ratio 
(Consumer) 
-1.07 
(0.67) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-1.21*** 
(0.26) 
-1.22*** 
(0.26) 
Sales Composition Ratio 
(Overseas Exports) 
2.03 
(1.59) 
18.12*** 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.63) 
0.17 
(0.64) 
Constant 
263.54*** 
(71.79) 
-1.27 
(1.77) 
84.55*** 
(26.00) 
89.27*** 
(26.47) 
Year_dummy Y Y Y Y 
Region_dummy Y Y Y Y 
Observations 37,604 37,603 204,191 199,598 
Adj R2 0.61 - 0.62 0.62 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Source: Statistics Korea, “Wholesale and Retail Trade Survey MDIS,” 2006~2014; Statistics Korea, “Economic 
Census MDIS,” 2010; Korea Chain Store Association, the Yearbook of Retailers (2009~2015); Companies‟ Annual 
Reports (2006~2015).  
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to model 2, a 1%p rise in the PB sales ratio is likely to increase store sales by 22 
million won on average. It is still found that a higher PB sales ratio contributes to 
sales growth, but now the magnitude of the coefficient is decreased to 1/7 of the 
OLS estimate. 
The IRLS assigns low weight values to observations with large absolute values 
of residuals, while giving large values to those with small absolute values of 
residuals. Therefore, the IRLS helps to induce homoscedasticity such that more 
efficient and accurate estimates can be derived. 
Additionally, models 3 and 4 adopt the weighted least square (WLS) approach 
with a business multiplier and an employee multiplier as the weights, respectively. 
While both estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level, they are relatively 
close to the IRLS estimate as compared to that by OLS. 
Moving on to the impact of PB sales on retail profit (see Table 3),16 the IRLS 
model shows that a 1%p increase in the PB sales ratio tends to raise the retail profit 
by 2.65 million won. This tendency was consistently estimated in the following 
two WLS models, where retail profits are likely to rise by 8.31 and 9.04 million 
won, respectively. The coefficient fluctuates somewhat depending on the model, 
but all estimates confirm that higher PB sales contribute to increasing the sales and 
profits of retail stores. 
These findings are consistent with those by Ailawadi and Harlam (2004), who 
demonstrated a positive impact of PB expansion on retailer earnings. Indeed, the 
strategy of expanding PBs in response to a sluggish economy and heated 
competition appears to have been successful. 
 
TABLE 3—EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN THE PB SALES RATIO ON THE PROFITS OF RETAIL STORES 
Dep. Var.: Sales  
(100 million won) 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
IRLS 
(3) 
WLS_Firm 
(4) 
WLS_Emp 
PB Sales Ratio (0~1) 
51.94*** 
(8.56) 
2.65*** 
(0.19) 
8.31*** 
(1.15) 
9.04*** 
(1.18) 
Large Discount Store (0/1) 
150.43*** 
(1.60) 
146.66*** 
(0.03) 
160.55*** 
(0.62) 
160.49*** 
(0.63) 
Supermarket (0/1) 
5.24*** 
(0.80) 
-0.12*** 
(0.02) 
1.36*** 
(0.14) 
1.39*** 
(0.14) 
Headquarters (0/1) 
8.67*** 
(0.90) 
1.09*** 
(0.02) 
5.56*** 
(0.17) 
5.58*** 
(0.17) 
Branch (0/1) 
0.44 
(1.42) 
1.84*** 
(0.03) 
2.71*** 
(0.33) 
2.73*** 
(0.34) 
Shop Area (m2) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Business Period (months) 
0.05*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Number of Stores in Region 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Business Months per Year 
0.37*** 
(0.10) 
0.10*** 
(0.00) 
0.21*** 
(0.02) 
0.21*** 
(0.02) 
 
16Retail profit corresponds to value-added created by the retailer, which is calculated as the amount of total 
annual sales minus the total amount of goods purchased. 
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TABLE 3—EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN THE PB SALES RATIO ON THE PROFITS OF RETAIL STORES (CONT’D) 
Dep. Var.: Sales  
(100 million won) 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
IRLS 
(3) 
WLS_Firm 
(4) 
WLS_Emp 
Average Business Hours per Day 
1.24*** 
(0.43) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.32*** 
(0.09) 
0.33*** 
(0.09) 
Closed Days per Month 
1.97*** 
(0.29) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.39*** 
(0.06) 
0.40*** 
(0.06) 
Number of Households 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
Sales Composition Ratio 
(between Headquarters and Branch) 
0.37 
(0.25) 
0.16*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
Sales Composition Ratio 
(Wholesaler) 
0.35 
(0.30) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.25** 
(0.11) 
0.25** 
(0.11) 
Sales Composition Ratio 
(Retailer) 
0.07 
(0.21) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.13* 
(0.08) 
Sales Composition Ratio 
(Industrial Activity) 
-0.11 
(0.21) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.19** 
(0.08) 
-0.19** 
(0.08) 
Sales Composition Ratio 
(Consumer) 
-0.08 
(0.2) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.17** 
(0.08) 
-0.17** 
(0.08) 
Sales Composition Ratio 
(Overseas Exports) 
-1.94*** 
(0.49) 
-0.20*** 
(0.01) 
-1.46*** 
(0.19) 
-1.46*** 
(0.19) 
Purchase Composition Ratio 
(between Headquarters and Branch) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Purchase Composition Ratio 
(Producer) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Purchase Composition Ratio 
(Wholesaler) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Purchase Composition Ratio 
(Overseas Exports) 
1.33*** 
(0.07) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
1.28*** 
(0.03) 
1.28*** 
(0.03) 
Constant 
80.42*** 
(21.83) 
-0.21 
(0.47) 
10.93 
(7.84) 
12.42 
(7.98) 
Year_dummy Y Y Y Y 
Region_dummy Y Y Y Y 
Observations 37,604 37,604 204,191 199,598 
Adj R2 0.62 - 0.63 0.63 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Source: Statistics Korea, “Wholesale and Retail Trade Survey MDIS,” 2006~2014; Statistics Korea, “Economic 
Census MDIS,” 2010; Korea Chain Store Association, the Yearbook of Retailers (2009~2015); Companies‟ Annual 
Reports (2006~2015). 
  
VI. Impact of Increased PB Production on the Growth of 
Manufacturing Firms 
 
Will the expansion of PB products then help manufacturers‟ growth? To test 
this, I surveyed 1,000 manufacturers that were supplying their products to domestic 
corporate retail companies. The questionnaire mainly asked about sales, production 
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costs, delivery prices, final consumer prices, and the market share for both NBs and 
PBs. It also asked about quality differences between PBs and NBs, the method of 
PB development, types of unfair trade practices experienced, and other factors.17 
 
A. Impact on the Quantitative Growth (Sales) of Manufacturing Firms 
 
As in the analysis on the retail side, the key independent variable is the PB sales 
ratio. A firm‟s PB sales ratio is defined as the proportion of „major‟ PB sales to 
annual total sales. Because a firm may produce several and different types of PBs, I 
focused on the major PBs with the highest sales proportions.18 
The model is estimated using ordinary least squares while controlling for various 
firm characteristics. Table 4 shows the basic statistics of the main variables used in 
the regression analysis. 
According to the estimates (see model 1 in Table 5), a higher PB sales ratio 
tends to decrease sales of the top SMEs (PB sales ratio(t) = -2.76).19 Compared to 
this negative impact, large enterprises are affected more negatively (PB sales ratio(t) 
* Large enterprises = -8.10), while the middle and bottom SMEs are affected less 
negatively (PB sales ratio(t) * SMEs_middle = 2.06, PB sales ratio(t) * SMEs_ 
bottom = 2.38). The only positively affected group is the small business group (PB 
sales ratio(t) * Micro_businesses = 2.94). In short, all types of establishments with the 
 
TABLE 4—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SURVEY DATA 
Variables No. of Obs. Mean Std.. Dev. Min Max 
Sales (100 million won) 926 246.44  517.59  0.64  4,360.00  
Business Period (months) 926 16.58  11.20  1.00  64.00  
Large Enterprises (0/1) 926 0.06  0.23  0.00  1.00  
SMEs_top (0/1) 926 0.25  0.43  0.00  1.00  
SMEs_middle (0/1) 926 0.33  0.47  0.00  1.00  
SMEs_bottom (0/1) 926 0.24  0.43  0.00  1.00  
Micro-Businesses (0/1) 926 0.12  0.33  0.00  1.00  
PB Sales Ratio (%) 926 8.37  19.78  0.00  100.00  
Having Overseas Factory (0/1) 926 0.11  0.32  0.00  1.00  
Ranking of NB_1st  (0/1) 926 0.10  0.29  0.00  1.00  
Ranking of NB_2nd-3rd  (0/1) 926 0.18  0.38  0.00  1.00  
Ranking of NB_4th-5th  (0/1) 926 0.19  0.39  0.00  1.00  
Note: SMEs are categorized into „SMEs_top‟ (the upper 30%), „SMEs_middle‟ (the middle 40%) and „SMEs_bottom‟ 
(the bottom 30%) according to the employment size.  
 
17There were a total of 4,063 companies in the supplier list provided by retailers, but the final sample size was 
set to 1,000 firms in consideration of time and cost. The survey questionnaire is presented in Appendix of Lee (2017). 
18Suppose that one company produces NB milk and similar quality of PB milk as its main products and PB 
cheese as an auxiliary product. In this case, the yield of NB milk can be mostly influenced by PB milk rather than 
PB cheese. Considering this substitution pattern, PB sales ratio was set to reflect proportion of main PB product. 
19In Table 5, PB sales ratio represents the effect on top SMEs since it is not controlled as interaction terms 
and thus become base group. 
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TABLE 5—EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN THE PB SALES RATIO ON THE SALES OF MANUFACTURERS 
Dep. Var.: Sales_yr2015 (100 million won) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Business Period (months) 
3.57*** 
(0.85) 
3.58*** 
(0.85) 
4.10*** 
(0.88) 
Large Enterprises (0/1) 
1,665.90*** 
(44.16) 
1,668.44*** 
(44.13) 
1,650.59*** 
(44.41) 
SMEs_middle (0/1) 
-214.73*** 
(26.29) 
-213.98*** 
(26.21) 
-211.12*** 
(26.59) 
SMEs_bottom (0/1) 
-257.50*** 
(28.30) 
-255.09*** 
(28.26) 
-240.35*** 
(29.91) 
Micro-Businesses (0/1) 
-300.22*** 
(34.01) 
-297.72*** 
(33.92) 
-282.84*** 
(34.41) 
PB Sales Ratio (t) 
-2.76*** 
(1.01) 
  
PB Sales Ratio(t) * Large Enterprises 
-8.10* 
(4.31) 
  
PB Sales Ratio(t) * SMEs_middle 
2.06* 
(1.24) 
  
PB Sales Ratio(t) * SMEs_bottom 
2.38* 
(1.30) 
  
PB Sales Ratio(t) * Micro-Businesses 
2.94* 
(1.63) 
  
PB Sales Ratio(t-1)  
-2.65** 
(1.07) 
-2.88*** 
(1.09) 
PB Sales Ratio(t-1) * Large Enterprises  
-8.39* 
(4.31) 
-7.91* 
(4.32) 
PB Sales Ratio(t-1) * SMEs_middle  
2.11 
(1.30) 
2.59** 
(1.31) 
PB Sales Ratio(t-1) * SMEs_bottom  
2.29* 
(1.34) 
2.07 
(1.35) 
PB Sales Ratio(t-1) * Micro-Businesses  
2.85* 
(1.71) 
3.55** 
(1.74) 
Having Overseas Factory (0/1)   
76.53** 
(30.41) 
Industry Dummy N N Y 
Product Category Dummy N N Y 
Region Dummy N N Y 
Constant 
275.25*** 
(26.72) 
272.62*** 
(26.65) 
89.38 
(289.09) 
Observations 926 926 926 
R2 0.74 0.74 0.75 
 
exception of micro-businesses exhibit reduced sales when the PB sales ratio rises. 
Moreover the size of the decrease in sales was proportional to the size of the 
company. That is, a higher PB sales ratio negatively affects the quantitative growth 
of manufacturing firms on average. 
Model 2 considers the possibility of endogeneity of the PB sales ratio(t). The 
dependent variable, annual total sales (sales_yr2015), is located in the denominator 
when calculating PB sales ratio(t). Thus, when sales_yr2015 changes, both the 
dependent variable and the independent variable change even if PB sales remains 
constant. Considering this simultaneity problem, model 2 calculates the PB sales 
ratio using sales information as of the previous year(t-1). Further, model 3 controls 
for additional fixed effects with firm, industry, and region dummies. According to 
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the estimations, both models exhibit results similar to those of model 1 in terms of 
the direction and size of the coefficients. 
This leads to the question of why large companies and small businesses are 
affected differently. We can expect that as PB sales increase, the annual total sales 
will also increase. Micro-businesses appear to experience a quantitative growth 
effect from this path. In actuality, when micro-businesses sign PB delivery 
agreements with corporate retailers, they can increase their plant utilization rate 
and production volume. 
However, this explanation does not apply to larger corporations, whose overall 
sales decrease. Thus, for them, we can consider that sales of NBs are reduced due 
to the competition with PBs and that the characteristics of their NBs are different 
from those of micro-businesses. Indeed, Figure 5 shows that the larger the firm, the 
more it relies on the sales of NBs and the more top-selling NBs it has in the market. 
Considering this point, I apply the market share ranking of NBs to a regression 
analysis (See Table 6), finding that a 1%p rise in the PB sales ratio generates 
higher sales losses (approximately 1.06 billion won) in firms with top-selling NBs 
than in those with NBs ranked sixth or lower in sales. This implies that the 
cannibalization effect—PBs crowding out NBs—is stronger in firms with NBs 
which sell better in the market. 
This may be due to the practices of corporate retailers, who often place their PBs 
right next to best-selling NBs on shelves or replace NBs with PBs. In addition, NB 
consumers may switch to PBs if influenced by the recognition of PBs as being less 
expensive but of similar quality to NBs.20  
Meanwhile, the NBs of micro-businesses usually account for a small share of 
sales; thus, the effect of cannibalization can be relatively weak. The supply of PBs 
to corporate retailers helped them to secure more sales channels and higher 
capacity utilization rates, leading to higher sales. 
 
 
FIGURE 5. MARKET SHARE RANKING OF NBS BY FIRM SIZE 
Note: SMEs is the average for SMEs_top, SMEs_middle and SMEs_bottom. 
Source: Data from the Survey on Manufacturing Establishments (Korea Development Institute, 2016).  
 
20Along with the cannibalization effect, the low prices of PBs may lead to an overall increase in demand. 
While these two opposing effects coexist, the estimation results show that the former effect may be stronger than 
the latter. 
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TABLE 6—EFFECT OF AN INCREASE IN THE PB SALES RATIO ON THE SALES OF MANUFACTURERS 
Dep. Var: Sales_yr2015 (100 million won) 
PB Sales Ratio(t-1) 
-2.88*** 
(1.00) 
 PB sales ratio(t-1) * 
NB Ranking_1 
-10.63** 
(5.19) 
NB Ranking_1 
269.00*** 
(60.49) 
 PB sales ratio(t-1) *  
NB Ranking_2-3 
-9.14*** 
(2.63) 
NB Ranking_2-3 
285.38*** 
(49.84) 
 PB sales ratio(t-1) *  
NB Ranking_4-5 
-3.80 
(2.35) 
NB Ranking_4-5 
119.54** 
(46.81) 
 
Major PB sales(t) 
2.43*** 
(0.35) 
Observations 904 
 
R2 0.24 
Note: 1) As in the models in Table 4, several characteristics (business period, industry dummy, product category 
dummy, region dummy) are controlled. Their coefficients are available upon request. 2) Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
B. Impact on the Qualitative Growth (Operating Profit) 
of Manufacturing Firms 
 
As a follow-up question, it can be asked whether quantitative growth for micro-
businesses leads to qualitative growth. Specifically, this pertains to whether their 
higher sales from increased PB sales generate higher profits. 
According to the estimation results, there were no significant increases in the 
operating profits of most SMEs and even of micro-businesses (See Table 7). This 
implies that the production increase caused by the PB supply does not guarantee 
actual profit gains. 
To investigate the fundamental root of this finding, I measured how the value-
added (created by PB sales) was distributed between retailers and manufacturers. 
Figure 6 describes the manufacturers‟ production costs, their operating profits, and 
retailers‟ margins as a proportion of the final consumer price (= 100%).21  
In general, PB production is less costly because advertising, marketing and 
distribution costs borne by manufacturers are lower relative to the amounts they 
have to pay to supply NBs. This enables higher retail margins and operating profits 
for PBs, as shown in the case of large enterprises. 
On the other hand, SMEs and micro-businesses exhibit decreased operating 
profits and increased retail margins from PBs, and the increment of the retail 
margin appears to be larger compared to that of large companies. The fact that the 
retail margins for smaller firms are larger may not be a critical issue. If retailers 
expended more effort and funding to develop PBs with smaller companies, the 
resulting higher retail margins would be reasonable compensation for them. 
However, as shown in Table 8, most PBs have been developed from slight 
modifications from NBs (51.8%) or through package replacements of NBs (51.8%)  
 
21Figure 6 is generated using survey data (of operating profit per sale, production cost per sale, supply price 
and final consumer price) with an assumption pertaining to the retail margin. I set the retail margin of NB to 30%, 
which is the mean value of margins according to all types of retailers represented in the Wholesale and Retail 
Trade Survey (MDIS). A different level of retail margin caused no change in the implications. 
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TABLE 7—IMPACT OF INCREASED PB SALES ON THE OPERATING PROFIT OF MANUFACTURERS 
Dep. Var: Sales_yr2015 (100 million won) 
 Operating Profit  Operating Profit from PBs 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
PB Sales Ratio(t) 
 -0.34 
(0.32) 
 
 0.18* 
(0.09) 
 
PB Sales Ratio(t) * Large Enterprises 
 -3.079** 
(1.36) 
 
 6.77*** 
(0.42) 
 
PB Sales Ratio(t) * SMEs_middle 
 0.23 
(0.39) 
 
 -0.07 
(0.12) 
 
PB Sales Ratio(t) * SMEs_bottom 
 0.32 
(0.41) 
 
 -0.14 
(0.13) 
 
PB Sales Ratio(t) * Micro-Businesses 
 0.34 
(0.52) 
 
 -0.08 
(0.17) 
 
PB Sales Ratio(t-1) 
 
 
-0.33 
(0.34) 
  0.18* 
(0.10) 
PB Sales Ratio(t-1) * Large Enterprises 
 
 
-2.73** 
(1.36) 
  6.39*** 
(0.43) 
PB Sales Ratio(t-1) * SMEs_middle 
 
 
0.32 
(0.41) 
  -0.06 
(0.13) 
PB Sales Ratio(t-1) * SMEs_bottom 
 
 
0.31 
(0.43) 
  -0.14 
(0.14) 
PB Sales Ratio(t-1) * Micro-Businesses 
 
 
0.33 
(0.54) 
  -0.08 
(0.18) 
Observations 
 
893 893 
 
263 263 
R2 
 
0.22 0.22 
 
0.67 0.64 
Note: 1) All models in Table 6 are controlled for the business period, industry dummy, product category dummy, 
region dummy. 2) Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
 
FIGURE 6. NB AND PB: COMPOSITION OF RETAIL MARGINS, OPERATING PROFITS AND PRODUCTION COSTS 
Source: Based on data on operating profit per sales, production cost, unit price for supply and list price from the 
Survey on Manufacturing Establishments (Korea Development Institute, 2016). 
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TABLE 8—TYPES OF PBS IN COMPARISON WITH NBS 
 Response Percentage 
Slight Modification of NB 160 51.8 
Package Replacement of NB 81 26.2 
Entirely New Product 41 13.3 
Others 27 8.7 
Total 309 100.0 
Note: Based on companies with available data on PB sales. 
Source: Data from the Survey on Manufacturing Establishments (Korea Development Institute, 2016). 
 
or through package replacements of NBs (26.2%). Further, 88% of these cases 
occurred when SMEs and micro-businesses developed PBs. That is, it appears to be 
less convincing that efforts and costs by retailers are greater for PB development, 
especially in the case of smaller firms.  
Overall, the findings imply that the above profit sharing structure derives from 
an imbalance in the bargaining position, possibly providing a rational explanation 
of why micro-businesses exhibited no significant gains in their operating profits, 
even after their sales volumes increased. 
 
VII. Survey of the Types of PB Development and Unfair Trade 
Practices 
 
Such aspects of the profit distribution can be linked to the PB development 
methods. According to Table 9, approximately 31% of manufacturers claim to have 
converted their NBs to PBs upon the recommendation of retailers (11.7%) or to 
have supplied products (developed through their own skills and efforts) as PBs 
(19.7%). These methods of supplying PBs can hinder the self-reliance and 
competitiveness of manufacturers. Unfortunately, these methods are more 
frequently adopted by SMEs (32%) and micro-businesses (41%) than by large 
enterprises (19%). 
Even with the development of partnerships with retailers, accounting for the 
highest proportion, 77% of cases correspond to slight modifications of NB 
characteristics or a simple change in the packaging form, leading to higher 
substitutability between PBs and NBs. Overall, these PB development methods can 
help retailers to gain more profits, but they can also generate a strong 
cannibalization effect which affects manufacturers. 
With respect to unfair trade practices by retailers, 30 (9.7%) out of 309 
manufacturing suppliers reported that they had experienced such practices. With 
multiple answer choices allowed, the most common unfair request was to cut the 
supply price (20 firms, 34%), followed by the coerced development of PBs (8 
firms, 14%), transfers of promotional expenses (7 firms, 12%) and unreasonable 
returns (7 firms, 12%).  
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TABLE 9—METHODS OF PB DEVELOPMENT 
 
Total 
Large 
Enterprise 
SME 
Micro-
businesses 
Converting NBs to PBs at the 
Recommendation of Retailers 
36 
(11.7) 
3 
(9.4) 
28 
(11.2) 
5 
(18.5) 
In-house Development of PBs 
61 
(19.7) 
3 
(9.4) 
52 
(20.8) 
6 
(22.2) 
Development of Partnerships with 
Retailers 
212 
(68.6) 
26 
(81.3) 
170 
(68.0) 
16 
(59.3) 
Total 
309 
(100) 
32 
(100) 
250 
(100) 
27 
(100) 
Note: Based on companies with available data on PB sales. 
Source: Data from the Survey on Manufacturing Establishments (Korea Development Institute, 2016). 
 
VIII. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions 
 
This study finds that the expansion of PBs raises the profits of corporate retailers 
but insignificantly affects, or in some cases reduces, those of subcontracting 
manufacturers. This occurs not only because the sales of national brands (NBs) 
decline due to the launch of similar PBs but also because the imbalance in the 
bargaining positions of the two parties and potential unfair trade practices have 
caused retail margins to be set high while manufacturers‟ operating profits are set 
low. In this regard, this study suggests the following policy recommendations.  
Above all, the PB business should be subject to stricter inspections and monitoring 
to secure fair market orders. When investigating subcontractor transactions, the 
Fair Trade Commission should closely examine any violations of the ban on 
requesting management information of PB manufacturers (Article 11 of the 
Enforcement Decree of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail 
Business). By remaining involved in the PB development process, retailers may 
have access to suppliers‟ management information. Moreover, requests for reduced 
supply prices, the most frequently chosen item among unfair trade practices, could 
originate from retailers demanding or gaining access to suppliers‟ information. 
Further, of the surveyed PB manufacturers who reported that they had been 
coerced into complying with unfair trade practices, 83% admitted to accepting all 
or some of the requests. Their somewhat tepid stance may be rooted in concerns 
over profit losses in response to any rejections of retailers‟ requests. To tackle this, 
(other than institutional efforts to encourage reporting with improved 
confidentiality) the Fair Trade Commissions needs to intensify ex-officio 
investigations and increase the penalty levels for unfair trade practices so as to 
lower the possibility of the recurrence of such practices. 
Meanwhile, SME manufacturers need to step beyond the narrow domestic 
market into larger PB markets abroad by actively utilizing government support 
programs. The Private Label Manufacturers Association (PLMA) holds trade 
shows and exhibitions every year in Amsterdam (May), Chicago (November) and 
Shanghai (December), where retailers, buyers and PB manufacturers convene to 
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establish new channels and share product information. However, relatively few 
Korean manufacturers are aware of these events. Thus, there has been little 
participation. PB manufacturers must actively utilize government programs such as 
support for Overseas Distribution Network · Export Marketing (Ministry of SMEs 
and Startup) and Consumer Goods Specialization · Participation in Overseas 
Exhibitions (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy). At the same time, the 
government should focus on resolving the difficulties that these firms encounter 
while taking advantage of such policies and exploring trade partners. If 
manufacturing firms can successfully advance into new overseas markets and 
secure sales channels, they will become less dependent on domestic enterprise 
retailers. In doing so, they will eventually earn a better bargaining position for 
future negotiations. 
Lastly, the research environment needs to be improved so that analyses of the 
domestic PB industry becomes more active. Prime examples are creating additional 
subcategories, such as „PB,‟ „NB‟ and „Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM),‟ 
under the establishment‟s sales in Statistics Korea‟s annual Mining and 
Manufacturing Survey, or adding separate survey items that can help discern PB 
sales to the Wholesale and Retail Trade Survey. Further, the Korea Consumer 
Agency could add convenience stores and SSMs to their current targets—mostly 
large discount stores—for its survey on PB prices and marks. A shorter survey 
interval than the current three-year term would also help to improve the practicality 
and use of research information.
22
  
PBs have the potential to serve as a win-win scenario with regard to growth in 
the retail and manufacturing sectors. However, this can be achieved only when the 
value-added created during the production and sales processes is distributed via fair 
negotiations and contracts by market participants. To prevent PBs from being 
merely another type of subcontract, voluntary efforts by the industry and legal and 
institutional efforts by the government should be strengthened. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Ailawadi, Kusum and Bari Harlam. 2004. “An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of 
Retail Margins: The Role of Store-Brand Share,” Journal of Marketing, 68: 147-165. 
Bontemps, Christophe, Valérie Orozco, and Vincent Réquillart. 2008. “Private Labels, 
National Brands and Food Prices,” Review of Industrial Organization, 33(1): 1-22. 
Cho, Hye-Jeong, Seung-Chang Lee and Sung-Min Ryu. 2012. “A Political Proposal for the 
Private Brand Activation”, Journal of Distribution Research, 17(5):.113-128. 
Cuneo, Andres, Sandra J. Milberg, Jose Miguel Benavente, and Javier Palacios-Fenech. 
2015. “The Growth of Private Label Brands: A Worldwide Phenomenon?” Journal of 
International Marketing, 23(1): 72-90. 
Dhar, Sanjay and Stephen Hoch. 1997. “Why Store Brand Penetration Varies by Retailer,” 
Marketing Science, 16(3): 208-227. 
 
22In the future, PBs will no longer be me-too products, but they are likely to be differentiated from NBs in 
terms of the product characteristics. What are known as premium PBs will increase. In such a situation, economic 
analyses of how the characteristics of PBs are affected by the degree of the market power of the manufacturer and 
the type of distributor, or on how the changes in the characteristics influence consumer utility, will gain more 
attention. In order to carry out such research, it is necessary to secure micro-data at individual product level. 
VOL. 40 NO. 2      Impact of the Expansion of Private Brands on Korean Retail and Manufacturing 21 
Emart. Annual Report, 2006~2015 (in Korean).  
Griffith, Rachel, Ephraim Leibtag, Andrew Leicester, and Aviv Nevo. 2009. “Consumer 
Shopping Behavior: How Much Do Consumers Save?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
23(2): 99-120. 
HomePlus. Annual Report, 2006~2015 (in Korean).  
Korea Chain Store Association. Yearbook of Retailers, 2009~2015, (in Korean) 
Korea Consumer Agency. 2008. Survey on distribution of PB products at discount stores. 
Korea Consumer Agency. 2011. Survey on price, display, and consumer awareness of PB 
products at discount stores.  
Korea Consumer Agency. 2014. Comparative survey on PB products at discount stores. 
Korea Development Institute. 2016. “Business Opinion Survey on the Economic Effects of 
Expanding Private Brand of Large Retail Chains” (in Korean).  
Korea Economic Daily. 2016. Aug 22. Hankyung Business, 1082: 10-15 (in Korean). 
Lee, Jinkook. 2017a. “The Economic Effects of Expanding Private Brand of Large Retail 
Chains,” Policy Research 2017-02, Korea Development Institute (in Korean).  
Lee, Jinkook. 2017b. “Golden Era of PB: Who Reaped the Fruits of Growth?,” KDI Focus No. 
84, Korea Development Institute (in Korean).  
Lotte Mart. Annual Report, 2006~2015 (in Korean). 
Nielsen. 2014. “The State of Private Label around the World.” 
Olbrich, Rainer and Gundula Grewe. 2009. “Consequences of Competition between National 
Brands and Private Labels: Empirical Results from Different German Outlet Formats,” 
International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 34(1): 67-84. 
PLMA. 2014. “PLMA‟s Private Label Day 2014,” executive summary. 
Raju, Jagmohan S., Raj Sethuraman, and Sanjay Dhar. 1995. “The Introduction and 
Performance of Store Brands,” Management Science, 41(6): 957-978. 
Richards, Timothy, Stephen F. Hamilton and Paul M. Patterson. 2010. “Spatial Competition 
and Private Labels,” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 35(2): 183-208. 
Statistics Korea. 2010. “Economic Census Micro Data” (in Korean).  
Statistics Korea. “Wholesale and Retail Trade Survey Micro Data,” 2003~2014 (in Korean).  
 
 
LITERATURE IN KOREAN 
 
롯데마트. 『사업보고서』, 2006~2015.  
이마트. 『사업보고서』, 2006~2015.  
이진국. 2017a. 『대형유통업체 자체상품 확대의 경제적 효과에 관한 연구』, 정책연구시리즈 2017-
02, 한국개발연구원.  
이진국. 2017b. 『PB상품 전성시대, 성장의 과실은 누구에게로 갔나?』, KDI Focus No.84, 한국개발연구원. 
조혜정⋅이승창⋅류성민. 2012. 『유통업체 PB 상품 활성화를 위한 정책연구』, 유통연구, 제18권 제4호: 
113-128. 
통계청. 2010. 『경제총조사 마이크로데이터』.  
통계청, 『도소매업조사 마이크로데이터』, 2003~2014. 
한국개발연구원. 2016. 『대형유통업체 PB 상품 확대의 경제적 효과에 대한 기업의견조사』. 
한국경제신문사. 2016. 『한경비지니스』, No.1082: 10-15. 
한국소비자원. 2008. 『대형할인점 PB 상품 유통 실태조사』. 
한국소비자원. 2011. 『대형마트 PB 상품 가격⋅표시 실태 및 소비자 인식 조사』. 
한국소비자원. 2014. 『대형마트 PB 상품 비교조사』. 
한국체인스토어협회. 『유통업체연감』, 2009~2015.  
홈플러스. 『사업보고서』, 2006~2015. 
